As previous posts made
clear, Zabiuddin Ansari is likely providing Indian authorities with all manner
of information, which will be picked over and analyzed during the coming
months. One fact is immediately clear, however, and that is the Pakistan
security establishment remains unwilling to end its support for non-state
proxies. In the absence of a policy that succeeds in convincing, cajoling or
compelling Pakistan to change its behavior, it has become essential to devise
mechanisms to mitigate the external threats from Pakistan-based and
Pakistan-supported militants. Even if Pakistan were to make an unambiguous
effort to dismantle the militant infrastructure on its soil, such mechanisms
would still be necessary in the near term. While a host of states have pursued
unilateral measures, calls for international cooperation to manage these
threats have also increased. Ansari's story illustrates the importance of this
cooperation as well as its limits.
The U.S.-India Joint
Working Group on Counterterrorism is more than a decade old, but
counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries really accelerated after
the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The U.S. government only began paying greater
attention to Lashkar and its Indian affiliates in the wake of those attacks,
while American forensic assistance to India in building a strong case that they
were planned in Pakistan catalyzed a willingness in New Delhi to work more
closely with Washington. In addition to infusing the U.S.-India Joint Working
Group on Counterterrorism with new life, the two countries also launched a
Homeland Security Dialogue Ministerial in May 2011. Although ample room still
exists for improvement, officials in both countries agree that cooperation has
increased during the last few years.
Crucially, in the last
several years, the United States, India, and the United Kingdom all took steps
to facilitate counterterrorism efforts in Bangladesh. Lashkar has networks
throughout South Asia and stretching into East Asia, but Bangladesh has historically
been the most important staging ground for attacks against India. The group
began building up its networks there in the mid-1990s, and Indian operatives
played an important role in this effort from the outset. The growth of the
indigenous Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) provided another
mechanism for supporting attacks in India, which other Pakistan-based groups
(including the original HuJI) could attempt to leverage for this purpose as
well. Even more important than its role as a staging point for attacks,
Bangladesh became an important place of refuge for Indian operatives as well as
a transit point to and from Pakistan for men, material, and money. Ansari was
among those who took advantage of its role in this regard, fleeing to Bangladesh
in 2006 before ultimately moving on to Pakistan.
Since the mid-1990s,
control of the government in Dhaka has alternated between the Awami League and
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, with a military caretaker government in place
from late 2006 through early 2009. The Awami League historically has been
friendlier to India and less tolerant of Islamist-cum-jihadist actors than the
BNP, but at different times both parties have been guilty of turning a blind
eye to jihadist activities aimed at India.
Bangladeshi authorities
began cracking down on domestic jihadists like HuJI-B after 2005 when some of
them launched a series of bomb blasts across the country. In 2008, the Awami
League won a landslide election in which it campaigned on closer ties with India
and a promised crackdown on Islamist militancy. Meanwhile, New Delhi was
reaching out to improve relations with Dhaka, while the United States offered
valuable military and counterterrorism assistance as part of its push to
degrade jihadist networks in South Asia. In 2009-2010, Bangladesh
counterterrorism efforts expanded to include foreign elements as well. Indian,
Bangladeshi, British, and American interlocutors with whom the author met
during a recent visit to Dhaka all stressed that since 2010 Bangladesh has
become less hospitable terrain. Officials from India and Bangladesh also agreed
that counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries coupled with U.S.
assistance contributed to this improvement, a view shared by independent
experts.
The Persian Gulf,
however, has remained fertile soil in terms of a support base for South Asian
militancy. U.S. counterterrorism efforts vis-à-vis the Gulf have focused
primarily on terrorist threat financing, which is understandable given that a
host of jihadist groups rely heavily on fundraising networks there. What is
often overlooked is the role the Gulf can play as a logistical and recruitment
hub; for Lashkar, its Indian affiliates, and other Pakistan-based groups
interested in launching attacks against India. For these reasons, this author
has maintained that in terms of containing and degrading the threat from South
Asian militancy, particularly Lashkar and its Indian affiliates, greater focus
needs to be given to monitoring and infiltrating Gulf-based networks that could
be used to recruit operatives or provide logistical support for terrorist
attacks.
Recruitment efforts
typically focus on Indian Muslims working in the region as part of a diaspora
presence that numbers over 1 million. The presence of a Pakistani diaspora,
coupled with the large number of South Asians who travel annually to Saudi
Arabia for legitimate religious purposes, enables militants to blend in with
the masses and makes the Gulf an opportune place for operatives to meet.
Several Pakistan-based militant groups have ties with Saudi Arabia dating back
to the 1980s, while the Indian crime boss-cum-terrorist Dawood Ibrahim,
currently sheltering in Pakistan, has provided access to additional networks in
places such as the United Arab Emirates. Finally, Riyadh's close relationship
with Islamabad meant that anyone found engaging in militant activities was
simply sent back to Pakistan provided he was traveling on a Pakistani passport.
That is, until Zabiuddin Ansari's arrest in May 2011.
Ansari's arrest and
subsequent deportation is an example of how such cooperation should work and
the impact it can have. As typically is the case, the details of precisely how
Ansari's presence was detected in Saudi Arabia are somewhat opaque. It appears
he used an alias known to Indian intelligence to set up a website to inveigle
new recruits, but according to Indian officials with whom the author spoke, it
was U.S. intelligence that initially zoomed in on him. If so, this suggests
that information sharing between the two countries coupled with U.S.
capabilities to monitor Internet traffic led to his identification. It is clear
that once Ansari's identity was confirmed, the United States asked Saudi
authorities to detain him, and then worked in tandem with their Indian
counterparts to ensure he was not returned to Pakistan despite carrying a
passport from that country. It was more than a year before Ansari was turned
over to the Indian authorities.
Saudi Arabia's
willingness to deport Ansari to India came despite significant Pakistani
protestations - a decision which will be explored in the final post of this
series. Three points are important here. First, to reiterate, Ansari's
identification, arrest and subsequent deportation to India were the result of
greater international counterterrorism cooperation. Second, Ansari appears to
be providing Indian authorities with a trove of intelligence about Lashkar and
IM operations in Pakistan, India, and possibly the Gulf, which they have
pledged to share with the United States This is likely to enable additional
monitoring and infiltration of Lashkar and IM networks as well as assisting
ongoing investigations. Third, the fact that the Gulf is no longer a guaranteed
safe space for operations could have an impact on how militants conduct
activities there.
None of this spells the
end of the threat posed by Lashkar, the Indian Mujahideen, or other militants
based in Pakistan. Bangladesh is a far less viable logistical hub than in the
past, but gains there are reversible without continued vigilance. Further,
although Ansari's arrest and deportation is significant, the Gulf has not
suddenly become a no-go area. Finally, international cooperation is primarily a
means of threat containment and mitigation. It is no substitute for action in
Pakistan. Such a policy shift is unlikely in the near term, but in addition to
reducing the efficacy of Pakistan-based or supported militants, international
cooperation should send a message to Pakistan that it risks inviting further
isolation.
Veerapagupathy,,
Chothavilai Beach,
Thengamputhoor,
Kanyakumari.
Call@: 04652-221337,8220099080.
email:aveholidayhome@gmail.com
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